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Executive Summary 
This paper analyzes how well the IDRC, a research-for-development organization, is set- 
up to encourage and capitalize on innovative activities. It uses a framework developed by 
Annabalie composed of criteria considered essential by research scientists for fostering 
innovation. Given that IDRC is a research organization that was established to initiate, 
solicit and help develop innovative research ideas, it is not surprising that the 
organization is set-up well for encouraging innovation - it has a sound mechanism for 
considering new ideas, it gives public recognition to POs and research partners who 
successfully innovate, and it is does not punish for failed research projects. Furthermore, 
IDRC devotes adequate resources to encouraging and developing innovative research. 
Overall, Senior Management has created an environment characterized by freedom, a 
sense of challenge, and effective work groups. Despite this, the Centre can boast 
relatively few success stories. Given the nature of research that IDRC is supporting, very 
few of its research projects can be expected to be unqualified successes. However, after 
30 years, and more than $30 billion in research grants, IDRC likely would have been able 
to capitalize on such innovation with more successes if it had paid better attention to 
careful project management. IDRC has not fared well when it comes to project 
management related to seeing innovative research through the full project cycle. Project 
monitoring is poor, IDRC is working too superficially in too many countries, and it has a 
spotty record in disseminating research results to decision-makers in developing 
countries. Considering the current atmosphere of donor fatigue, it is essential that IDRC 
demonstrate to Canadians concrete impacts arising from the implementation of high- 
quality research results. On the basis of this analysis, the following recommendations are: 
Attaining an 80 per cent monitoring approval rate by recipients within five years. 
Establishing a research dissemination and policy-uptake branch within two years; 
Cutting by 50 per cent the number of countries where new projects will be 
supported by fiscal year 2002-03. 
Introduction 
This report analyzes how well the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is 
set up to encourage and capitalize on innovative activities. 
In today's world, information and, more importantly, knowledge are the cornerstones of 
success for more and more organizations. For a cutting-edge research organization like 
IDRC, new knowledge depends on developing innovative ideas and technologies, or 
implementing and improving old technologies in innovative ways. 
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First, this document comprehensively describes IDRC's mission, and then outlines the 
conceptual framework used to analyze the Centre. It then examines how IDRC fares 
against each element of the framework -investigating the underlying reasons for its 
performance. After describing what is most important for IDRC to address and why, 
three major recommendations are outlined, and conclusions are offered. 
Overview of IDRC 
The International Development Research Centre is a Canadian Crown Corporation that 
supports scientists in developing countries who are conducting research to alleviate their 
social, economic and environmental problems 
The Centre was established in 1970, to build research capacity in the South. Specifically, 
the IDRC Act states that the public corporation is "to initiate, encourage, support, and 
conduct research into the problems of the developing regions of the world.'" While the 
IDRC is a Crown Corporation, it is intended to operate at arms-length from the Canadian 
government. Although the Act states that IDRC may use its budget to conduct its own 
research, historically it has focused on helping developing countries become self- 
sufficient in solving their own problems. IDRC often uses the following metaphor to 
describe its mandate: feeding a hungry man will allay his hunger for a day, while 
teaching him how to fish will allow him to allay his own hunger for a lifetime. 
In addition to its head-office in Ottawa, IDRC has six offices in the South: Singapore, 
New Delhi, Cairo, Dakar, Nairobi, and Montevideo. The bulk of IDRC's funding, 36 per 
cent, supports research in Africa, while 26 per cent goes towards research in Latin 
America and 22 per cent towards research in Asian. The remainder assists global 
activities. IDRC's current budget of $85 million is spent supporting its recipients with 
research grants, as well as covering the salaries of its Program Officers (POs) -- 
specialists who help develop research programs, monitor research projects, and guide its 
recipients work. 
IDRC has evolved considerably since it was first set-up with a budget of $1.4 million in 
1970. IDRC projects during the first decade focused on single commodities, single crops, 
and single centres of economic activity, and were typically confined to a single scientific 
discipline. Examples were the development of new crop varieties such as canola, or 
mechanical devices such as better handpumps, or economic studies into how 
marginalized people, such as rickshaw drivers, earned a living. 
During the 1980's, IDRC began stressing more inter-division collaboration. For example, 
health scientists and communication experts worked together to increase the acceptance 
of immunization of the poor in Indonesia. As the number of trained scientists in the 
South continued to grow, projects aimed at developing research capacity became less 
relevant for some countries, and IDRC began to see that funding of networks and 
information-sharing mechanisms were more important. 
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In the 199OYs, IDRC had to respond to Federal Government budget cuts that reduced its 
parliamentary appropriation from $1 15 million at the beginning of the decade to $87 
million at the end of the decade. This required laying-off staff. The Centre also responded 
by moving from an emphasis of 55 divisional subprograms grouped by scientific 
division, such as health sciences, to 1 1 multidisciplinary program initiatives that sought 
to address specific, well-defined problems. 
Notable innovations resulting from IDRC research include: developing a disease resistant 
variety of Canola for China, a technology to harvest drinking water from fog in remote 
mountainous regions of Chile, and helping the exiled mass democratic movement in 
South Africa prepare for a post-Apartheid state by building its environmental and 
scientific research capacity,2 
Innovation at IDRC can be measured in two ways - innovations in products themselves, 
such as the "gold-finger banana," a new banana variety more resistant to pests that has 
increased the incomes of poor farmers in Latin America, or innovations in the way IDRC 
supports the research. Of course, the former often depends upon the latter. 
Framework used to organize the discussion 
The conceptual framework developed by ~ r n a b i l e ~  based on a comprehensive study of 
120 Research and Development (R&D) Scientists from more than 20 corporations will be 
used as a basis for analyzing IDRC. The scientists were asked to outline factors that 
seemed important to either very high or very low creativity in their organizations. While 
the scientists related features relevant to both personal qualities and environmental 
factors, the latter were mentioned more often than personal qualities. The importance of 
environmental factors is notable, not because intrinsic motivation of people is less 
important to creativity than to environmental factors. However, once it hires its staff, an 
organization can do little to change or cultivate traits relating to intrinsic motivation, but 
it can change the environment or, at least, staff perception of it.4 The scientist's 
responses were grouped into nine different qualities of environments that enhance 
creativity, ranked below: 
1. Freedom 
2. Good project management 
3. Sufficient resources 
4. Encouragement 
5. Various organizational characteristics 
6. Recognition 
7. Sufficient time 
8. Challenge 
9. Pressure 
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Annabalie also was able to distill nine of the most important environmental obstacles to 
creativity. They are largely the opposite of the positive characteristics given above. For 
example, instead of freedom, project teams faced constraints, although in events of poor 
creativity, the inhibitors were not necessarily ranked in the same order as the stimulants 
to creativity. Annabalie later grouped the above factors into the following three elements 
of a conceptual framework for analyzing innovation in organizations: 
Organizational motivation to innovate. This element reflects how well the 
organization itself, as distinct from management practices, is set-up to innovate. It 
includes: 
A mechanism for considering new ideas 
Open, active communication of information and ideas 
Reward and recognition of creative work 
Fair evaluation of work, including an atmosphere where failure is not fatal 
Resources. What an organization makes available to support innovative work, including: 
Sufficient time 
People with necessary expertise and 
Adequate funds 
Management Practices. This reflects both corporate level management and management 
at lower levels and includes: 
Freedom in doing one's work 
A sense of challenge in the nature of work problems 
Compilation of effective work groups 
Effective and Disciplined project management 
It is useful to group the factors because it makes it easier to isolate the over-riding causes 
of either successful or failed innovation. For instance, perhaps the organization is 
structurally set-up to encourage innovation, but it hires managers that are not. However, 
the elements do overlap and are obviously related. Also, they can either undermine or 
reinforce each other. For instance, management practices that encourage innovation can 
eventually change the very culture of an organization, and this can attract better managers 
who will then help build the virtuous circle. Conversely, if inadequate time is not 
available to experiment with approaches that may go nowhere, then staff will not be 
entrepreneurial, no matter what the company mission statement or Act says. 
The above framework will be used to analyze IDRC because it is represents the latest 
thinking on creativity, and because the original factors and their rankings were based on 
interviews with R&D Scientists - IDRC is a R&D organization. 
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Analysis 
This section analyzes how well IDRC encourages and capitalizes on innovative work. 
Organizational motivation to innovate 
By definition, as a research organization, IDRC strives for innovation. In fact, innovation 
is crucial to IDRC's continued support from the Government of Canada. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the organization is structurally set-up very well to encourage innovation. 
IDRC is set-up to welcome new and innovative ideas, including unsolicited proposals, 
from scientists in developing countries who need funds and technical support to firther 
developing their research. The proposal review mechanism is well structured, with a clear 
review process that requires reviews from at least three different IDRC POs. 
There are three mechanisms that must be engaged before IDRC supports new research 
ideas, even for research ideas that do not fit into the existing program framework.. First, a 
PO may propose an "exploration" - a focused study of a new research area. If the 
proposal is considered feasible, he or she is awarded funds to further develop the idea. An 
exploration can turn into a new PI, or a secretariat or a special project. Existing projects 
within PIS that have evolved past conventional IDRC funding can also turn into 
secretariats or special projects. 
Through international secretariats, IDRC brings together donors to develop research 
agendas and share costs. Secretariats are able to undertake research that is more 
ambitious than the Centre would be able to support on its own. IDRC manages nine 
international secretariats, such as the Micronutrient Initiative, established to find the best 
ways to eliminate deficiencies in vitamin A, iron and iodine among the world's poor. 
In addition to its program initiatives and secretariats, IDRC has developed several large 
corporate projects. These projects respond to special needs and opportunities that fall 
outside the Centre's conventional finding framework. For example, IDRC supports 
Canada's participation in the Middle East Peace Process by managing the Expert and 
Advisory Services Fund set up by the Department of Foreign Affairs and CIDA. 
IDRC's atmosphere is intellectually simulating. Workshops and seminars on a myriad of 
fascinating developmental issues such as globalization and the environment are regularly 
held in the Centre, and all staff members are encouraged to attend as many as possible. 
Given IDRC's mandate, innovative work receives the most feedback and recognition. 
Both IDRC POs and the researchers they support are recognized for developing 
innovative projects through public acknowledgment of their work, and dissemination of 
results to their peers, the public and other development organizations. This includes: 
Publication of interviews with IDRC experts on IDRC's public website; 
Profiling POs and scientists in IDRC's Annual Report and IDRC Reports, a 
glossy publication; and, 
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Arrangement of interviews with the media. 
Special monetary rewards for innovation are non-existent because they would not 
respond to the intrinsic motivation of IDRC POs, and may conflict with research meant to 
serve the public good rather than private interests. 
Scientists in developing countries undertake their research in an atmosphere of ignorance, 
poverty, conflict, corruption and other difficult social and institutional problems. And 
although the scientists are intelligent and idealistic, they often have low research capacity 
and sometimes work in dysfunctional institutions that mirror the societies where they are 
located. For the last two decades, many Southern countries have regressed, rather than 
developed. Thus, very few of IDRC's research projects that develop an innovative 
product or policy are expected to achieve unqualified success. Failure cannot be 
considered fatal in the sense that this is the nature of research, especially in a developing 
country context. 
Another reason for high organizational motivation in IDRC is that structural elements 
that deter creativity, such as turf battles, destructive criticism and internal competition are 
minimal. Furthermore, as an independent Crown Corporation, not subject to standard 
treasury board guidelines, a level of bureaucracy far lower than most government 
departments characterizes IDRC. This gives individual staff far more flexibility to 
respond to the particular needs of the situation. 
Resources 
Given its mandate, IDRCYs funding is made available for innovative work. The Centre 
also reserves part of its budget every year for unforeseen projects that do not fit anywhere 
else. 
Sufficient time to do innovate work can sometimes be a problem, because innovation 
resulting in sustainable development results takes time. In some respects, IDRC can often 
have too innovative a perspective, by moving on to the next cutting-edge issue before the 
research ideas supported earlier have been nurtured, however this point will be discussed 
further below. POs must approve projects and spend budgets by the end of the year. This 
latter point is not really a criticism, rather an observation of the inherent tension that must 
be balanced because IDRC is a government granting agency. 
IDRC also has talented people with the expertise to recognize innovative ideas when they 
see them, and who have the technical expertise to help nurture the idea. POs have a wide 
variety of background incorporating all elements of the applied, natural and social 
sciences. IDRC POs are expected to work mainly in one PI, called their home PI, but to 
also act as a resource member with another PI, spending 15 to 25 per cent of their time on 
the latter. Finally, when necessary, POs also have the freedom to hire specialized 
consultants, when the required expertise does not exist within the Centre. 
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Management Practices. 
IDRC POs enjoy considerable freedom in how they do their work.. Each PO is granted a 
yearly research and travel budget that can be used as he or she sees best fit, within 
ethical and strategic program framework guidelines. The travel budget allows for 10 to 20 
weeks of fieldwork travel a year. IDRC's POs are also free to attract more funds from 
other PIS within IDRC, or, with the support of the Partnership and Business Development 
Office, to attract funds from other donor organizations, such as CIDA and the World 
Bank. 
IDRC Senior Management and its POs are scientists possessing a deep-rooted social 
consciousness working to address development problems by applying methodical, 
scientific approaches. They have traveled a great deal witnessing many development 
projects, most of which failed. The staff tends to be motivated by the daunting challenge 
of addressing these successes and failures, either at the micro- or macro-level. IDRC 
Management reinforces this intrinsic challenge by maintaining an intellectual 
atmosphere. 
However, in the past, management has not been very disciplined about moving from the 
general challenge of helping address poverty through research, towards defining more 
specific and measurable challenges. For example, IDRC will install and pilot-test 15 low- 
cost sustainable waste treatment plants in Jordan by the end of 2002. Management finally 
required these types of specific objectives in a prospectus of results that all PIS had to 
produce in 1999. 
Since 1995, when it re-organized, IDRC PI teams have been multidisciplinary, "whole- 
brains, with cross-functional expertise and experiences from different countries. For 
example, a team examining mercury contamination in the Amazon included a 
neurotoxicologist, a tropical forester, a fisheries biologist, and a sociologist. Staff 
challenges each other's ideas in constructive, good-natured, and even humorous ways. 
They tend to trust each other, communicate well, and are mutually supportive. 
IDRC does not fare as well, however, when it comes to project management, which is 
often undisciplined and ineffective. The failure lies in three main areas. First, despite the 
excellence of its staff, project monitoring has never been very good in IDRC, and has 
deteriorated in recent years. Because of insufficient guidance resulting from overworked 
POs, the vast majority of scientists in developing countries actually carrying out the work 
are not able to attain their full potential for achieving real measurable results. 
Furthermore, POs often want to monitor projects more frequently, but do not have the 
time because they are working in too many countries, which limits the number of field 
visits they can make to each project. Finally, from the project outset, IDRC has been 
historically poor at disseminating and implementing its research results. It has not 
acknowledged that, to do this, it must deal directly with policy-makers, nor has it 
recognized that other donor agencies, even other Canadian organizations such as CIDA, 
are usually not interested in implementing IDRC's research and that it must do this itself. 
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All of these factors have meant that although IDRC has helped support a lot of innovative 
ideas, too few have changed people's lives in demonstrable ways. 
The forgoing analysis demonstrates that IDRC is very good at soliciting and developing 
creative ideas because of the way that the organization was originally set-up. Most of its 
management practices supporting innovation are also sound, with the exception of factors 
crucial to concrete impacts resulting from innovative research. Despite this, the Centre 
can boast relatively few success stories. In an atmosphere of dwindling foreign aid 
budgets and general donor fatigue, it is crucial that IDRC demonstrate to Canadians 
concrete results arising from the implementation of high-quality research. IDRC is trying 
to reach this audience, but has little to sell them. IDRC needs to develop a complete 
product to sell them. 
The key to this strategy is the first step - obtaining better results from each research 
project it funds, because poor results will not be implemented. Increasing the proportion 
of research projects that succeed depends on better support from Program Officers. 
Although POs are knowledgeable and well meaning, this does not mean they are good 
coaches, or disciplined enough to monitor frequently. Sometimes they want to monitor 
more frequently, but do not have the time because they are working in too many 
countries, thus limiting the number of field visits they can make to each project. 
Working in fewer countries will result in less travel stress on POs, and the ability to 
spend more time coaching individual recipients. It also offers the advantage of synergy, 
as the results gathered for one research project in a particular country can frequently feed 
into another. Finally, it will help IDRC work with governments to implement research 
results, because the more time spent working in the country will improve relationships 
between IDRC staff, local NGOs and local government decision-makers. 
On the basis of the fore-going analysis, the following three recommendations are: 
Attaining an 80 per cent monitoring approval rate by recipients within five years 
This will include setting-up guidelines for monitoring projects in the field, by identifying 
how successful projects were monitored and then by developing a monitoring training 
program for POs. It will also outline Senior Management requirements for concise 
monthly reports on each research project, and a minimal communication schedule beyond 
email (teleconference, videoconference, or on-site travel). 
Setting up a research dissemination and policy-uptake branch within two years 
This will require setting-up a new branch and hiring a VP for it, who will study the 
development policy branches of other donor organizations, identify necessary new staff 
qualifications, and then recruit and hire them. 
Cutting by 50 per cent the number of countries where new projects will be 
supported by fiscal year 2002-03 
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This will require identifying the countries where IDRC will support projects, first by 
outlining the criteria necessary for choosing the countries, and then by going through a 
strategic planning session to choose them. Senior Management will have to decide how 
quickly IDRC will withdraw from each country, and develop a communications plan to 
inform the countries of the planned withdrawal. 
Conclusion 
IDRC is a research organization established to initiate, solicit and develop innovative 
research ideas. Thus, it is not surprising that the organization is set-up well to encourage 
innovation - it has a sound mechanism for considering new ideas, it gives public 
recognition to POs and research partners who successfully innovate, and it is does not 
punish for failed research projects. Furthermore, it grants sufficient resources for 
encouraging and developing innovative research. On the whole, its management practices 
are also sound. However, IDRC has not capitalized on the innovation that it has 
encouraged. The Centre can boast relatively few success stories. Given the nature of 
research that IDRC is supporting, very few of its research projects can be expected to be 
unqualified successes. However, after 30 years, and more than $30 billion in research 
grants, IDRC would likely have been able to capitalize on such innovation with more 
successes if it had paid better attention to careful project management. Project monitoring 
is poor and POs tend to focus on developing the next innovative idea instead of helping 
research partners gain optimal results from the projects currently underway. IDRC is 
collecting too many new research ideas from too many different countries, instead of 
focusing on a few countries and enjoying the synergies that result from a more focused 
effort. Finally, IDRC has historically been poor at disseminating its research results to 
decision-makers in developing countries. None of these failings are due to the inherent 
nature of IDRC itself. Its Act and mandate encourage IDRC to follow-through so that its 
innovative research has a measurable impact on the lives of the poor. Rather this has 
resulted from Senior Management devoting insufficient attention to this task. Considering 
the current atmosphere of donor fatigue, it is essential that IDRC demonstrate to 
Canadians concrete impacts arising from the implementation of high-quality research 
results. On the basis of this analysis, the following recommendations are made: 
Attain an 80 per cent monitoring approval rate by recipients within five years. 
Set-up a research dissemination and policy-uptake branch within two years; 
Cut by 50 per cent the number of countries where new projects will be supported, 
by fiscal year 2002-03. 
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